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\begin{document}
	
	\title{Managing Risk Heterogeneity in Risk-Sharing Groups: A Multi-Method Study on Risk Aversion and Solidarity
	}
	
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	\author{ }
	
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	\maketitle


This appendix includes (\ref{s.robust.ch5}) the results of the robustness checks for both studies; and (\ref{s.instr}) the instructions for the experiment. 

\newpage
\section{Robustness Checks}
\label{s.robust.ch5}
\begin{table}[th] \centering 
	\begingroup\footnotesize
	\caption{Multilevel OLS regression analyses on commitment for low-risk subgroup of each Broodfonds group ($N = 1973$)} 
	\label{t.bf.reg.lowrisk} 
	\begin{tabular}{@{\extracolsep{-24pt}}lD{.}{.}{-2} D{.}{.}{-2} D{.}{.}{-2} D{.}{.}{-2} D{.}{.}{-2} D{.}{.}{-2}} 
		\\[-1.8ex]\hline 
		\hline \\[-1.8ex] 
		& \multicolumn{2}{c}{(M0)} & \multicolumn{2}{c}{(M1)} & \multicolumn{2}{c}{(M2)}\\ 
		\hline \\[-1.8ex] 
		\textbf{Members} & & & & & & \\
		Intercept & 3.922^{***} & (0.023) & 2.987^{***} & (0.175) & 2.992^{***} & (0.175) \\ 
		Risk aversion & & & 0.004^{*} & (0.002) & 0.004^{*} & (0.002) \\ 
		Risk aversion $\times$ Risk heterogeneity& &  & & &0.007 & (0.008) \\ 
		Solidarity & & & 0.428^{***} & (0.019) & 0.428^{***} & (0.019) \\ 
		Solidarity $\times$ Risk heterogeneity& &  & & &0.077 & (0.062) \\ 
		Perceived risk& &  &  0.002 & (0.035) & 0.004 & (0.035) \\ 
		Received benefit & & & 0.116 & (0.111) & 0.109 & (0.111) \\ 
		Benefit size& &  & 0.001 & (0.003) & 0.001 & (0.003) \\ 
		\# Years Broodfonds $-$ \# years member & & & -0.012 & (0.016) & -0.012 & (0.016) \\ 
		Gender: Female& &  &-0.017 & (0.032) & -0.016 & (0.032) \\ 
		Age & & & 0.017^{***} & (0.002) & 0.017^{***} & (0.002) \\ 
		Board member & & & 0.179^{**} & (0.056) & 0.178^{**} & (0.056) \\ 
		Trust& &  & 0.338^{***} & (0.017) & 0.338^{***} & (0.017) \\ 
		Strong tie degree & & & 0.004^{*} & (0.002) & 0.004^{*} & (0.002) \\  
		Total degree& &  & 0.002^{***} & (0.000) & 0.002^{***} & (0.000) \\ 
		\textbf{Groups} & & & & & & \\
		Risk heterogeneity & & & -0.224^{**} & (0.072) & -0.226^{**} & (0.072) \\ 
		Relative number of benefits & & &0.547 & (0.390) & 0.550 & (0.390) \\ 
		Total number of members & & & 0.000 & (0.003) & 0.000 & (0.003) \\ 
		\# Years Broodfonds & & & -0.053^{***} & (0.015) & -0.054^{***} & (0.015) \\ 
		Dense network & & & 0.113 & (0.059) & 0.115 & (0.059) \\ 
		Clustered network& &  & 0.040 & (0.045) & 0.040 & (0.045) \\ 
		Star network & & & 0.058 & (0.049) & 0.059 & (0.049) \\ 
		\hline \\[-1.8ex] 
		Random intercept group & & 0.044 &  & 0.012 & & 0.012  \\
		Residual variance & & 0.835 & & 0.433 &  & 0.433  \\
		Intraclass correlation && 0.050 && 0.028 && 0.028 \\
		\hline \\[-1.8ex] 
		Log Likelihood & & -3,636.586 &  & -2,055.376 & & -2,059.998 \\ 
		Akaike Inf. Crit. & &7,279.172 &  &4,154.751 & &4,167.995 \\ 
		Bayesian Inf. Crit.& &7,296.868 &  & 4,277.672 & &4,302.091 \\ 
		\hline 
		\hline \\[-1.8ex] 
		\textit{Note:} $^{*}p< 0.05$; $^{**}p< 0.01$; $^{***}p< 0.001$ \\ 
	\end{tabular} 
	\endgroup
\end{table} 

\newpage
\begin{table}[h!] \centering \footnotesize
	\caption{EHA on the likelihood of withdrawal for low-risk subjects of each experimental risk-sharing group (113 events, $N = 2710$)} 
	\label{t.eha.lowrisk} 
	\begin{tabular}{@{\extracolsep{-15pt}}lD{.}{.}{-3} D{.}{.}{-3} D{.}{.}{-3}D{.}{.}{-3} D{.}{.}{-3} D{.}{.}{-3} } 
		\\[-1.8ex]\hline 
		\hline \\[-1.8ex] 
		\\[-1.8ex] & \multicolumn{2}{c}{(M1a)} & \multicolumn{2}{c}{(M1b)} & \multicolumn{2}{c}{(M2)}\\ 
		\hline \\[-1.8ex] 
		Received benefit & 0.273 & (0.266) & 0.270 & (0.266) & 0.255 & (0.266) \\ 
		Risk aversion & -0.019 & (0.014) & 0.010 & (0.020) & 0.003 & (0.027) \\ 
		Risk aversion $\times~t$ & & & -0.005^{*} & (0.002) & -0.005^{*} & (0.002) \\ 
		Risk aversion $\times$ HG-H & && &  & 0.008 & (0.029) \\ 
		Solidarity & -0.028^{*} & (0.011) & -0.029^{**} & (0.011) & -0.015 & (0.016) \\ 
		Solidarity $\times$ HG-H &  &&&  & -0.030 & (0.023) \\ 
		Risk & -1.826 & (3.053) & -2.002 & (3.056) & -1.941 & (3.082) \\ 
		Gender: Female & -0.381 & (0.224) & -0.340 & (0.225) & -0.389 & (0.229) \\ 
		Age & -0.070 & (0.069) & -0.066 & (0.069) & -0.071 & (0.069) \\ 
		Game theory & -0.671 & (0.427) & -0.668 & (0.426) & -0.674 & (0.428) \\ 
		Treatment: HG-H & 0.020 & (0.228) & -0.002 & (0.228) & -0.039 & (0.236) \\ 
		Total members $t - 1$ & -0.074 & (0.092) & -0.071 & (0.091) & -0.063 & (0.092) \\ 
		Total left $t - 1$ & 0.402 & (0.223) & 0.414 & (0.222) & 0.427 & (0.221) \\ 
		Num. sick members RSG $t - 1$ & 0.409^{***} & (0.082) & 0.409^{***} & (0.083) & 0.413^{***} & (0.083) \\ 
		\hline
		\hline \\[-1.8ex] 
		%R^2 & \multicolumn{2}{c}{0.16} & \multicolumn{2}{c}{0.16} & \multicolumn{2}{c}{0.16} \\ 
		%LR Test & \multicolumn{2}{c}{87.323$^{***}$ (df = 13)} & \multicolumn{2}{c}{90.068$^{***}$ (df = 14)} & \multicolumn{2}{c}{90.180$^{***}$ (df = 16)} \\ 
		%		LR $\chi^2$ Test & 47.894^{***} & \multicolumn{1}{c}{~~(df = 11)} & \multicolumn{1}{c}{52.338^{***} &\multicolumn{1}{c}{~~(df = 12)} & 54.249^{***}& \multicolumn{1}{c}{~~(df = 14)} \\ 
		%		LR $\chi^2$ Difference Test &4.444^{*}&\multicolumn{1}{c}{~(df = 1)}&1.911&\multicolumn{1}{c}{~(df = 2)} \\
		LR $\chi^2$ Test & 47.894^{***} & \multicolumn{1}{c}{~~(df = 11)} & 52.338^{***} &\multicolumn{1}{c}{~~(df = 12)} & 54.249^{***}& \multicolumn{1}{c}{~~(df = 14)} \\ 
		LR $\chi^2$ Difference Test &&&4.444^{*}&\multicolumn{1}{c}{~(df = 1)}&1.911&\multicolumn{1}{c}{~(df = 2)} \\
		%LR $\chi^2$ Difference Test && 4.107^{*} &\multicolumn{1}{c}~(df = 1)} & 0.209 & \multicolumn{1}{c}{~~(df = 2)} \\
		\hline 
		\hline \\[-1.8ex] 
		\textit{Note:}  $^{*}p<0.05$; $^{**}p<0.01$; $^{***}p<0.001$ \\ 
	\end{tabular} 
\end{table} 


\begin{table}[h!] \centering 
	\begingroup\footnotesize
	\caption{Multilevel EHA on the likelihood of withdrawal (216 events, $N = 5625$)} 
	\label{t.ml.eha} 
	\begin{tabular}{@{\extracolsep{-17pt}}lD{.}{.}{-3} D{.}{.}{-3} D{.}{.}{-3} D{.}{.}{-3} D{.}{.}{-3} D{.}{.}{-3}} 
		\\[-1.8ex]\hline 
		\hline \\[-1.8ex] 
		\\[-1.8ex] & \multicolumn{2}{c}{(M1a)} & \multicolumn{2}{c}{(M1b)} & \multicolumn{2}{c}{(M2)}\\ 
		\hline \\[-1.8ex] 
		\textbf{Rounds}& & & & & & \\
		Received benefit&  1.275 & (0.184) & 1.278 & (0.184) & 1.279 & (0.184) \\ 
		\textbf{Subjects}& & & & & & \\
		Risk aversion& 0.986 & (0.011) & 1.007 & (0.015) & 1.006 & (0.019) \\  
		Risk aversion $\times~t$ &  &  & 0.996^{*} & (0.002) & 0.996^{*} & (0.002) \\ 
		Risk aversion $\times$ HG-H &  &  &  &  & 1.002 & (0.021) \\ 
		Solidarity& 0.967^{***}& (0.008) & 0.967^{***} & (0.008) & 0.969^{**} & (0.011) \\ 
		Solidarity $\times$ HG-H &  &  &  &  & 0.996 & (0.017) \\ 
		Risk& 0.106^{*} & (1.12) & 0.102^{*} & (1.123) & 0.102^{*} & (1.124) \\ 
		Gender: Female& 0.676^{*} & (0.157) & 0.691^{*} & (0.158) & 0.686^{*} & (0.16) \\ 
		Gender: Other (not disclosed)&0.387 & (1.025) & 0.394 & (1.026) & 0.397 & (1.026) \\ 
		Age&  0.948 & (0.049) & 0.95 & (0.049) & 0.95 & (0.05) \\ 
		Game theory& 0.597 & (0.29) & 0.591 & (0.292) & 0.592 & (0.293) \\ 
		\textbf{Groups}& & & & & & \\
		Treatment: HG-H&0.978 & (0.162) & 0.967 & (0.167) & 0.961 & (0.169) \\ 
		Total members $t - 1$&0.959 & (0.07) & 0.969 & (0.07) & 0.967 & (0.07) \\ 
		\# sick members RSG $t - 1$&1.481^{***} & (0.061) & 1.483^{***} & (0.061) & 1.483^{***} & (0.061) \\ 
		Total left $t - 1$& 1.581^{**} & (0.166) & 1.578^{**} & (0.166) & 1.578^{**} & (0.166) \\ 
		\hline \\[-1.8ex] 
		Random intercept group & & 0.070 & & 0.088 & & 0.084 \\
		\hline \\[-1.8ex] 
		%(df) $\chi^2$ &  \multicolumn{13}{r}{(1)}&90.62^{***}  & \multicolumn{1}{r}{(14)}&95.05^{***} &  \multicolumn{1}{r}{(16)}&90.70^{***} \\
		(df) $\chi^2$ & \multicolumn{1}{r}{(13)} & 90.62^{***} & \multicolumn{1}{r}{(14)}&95.05^{***} & \multicolumn{1}{r}{(16)}&95.11^{***} \\
		(df) $\chi^2$ difference & & &  \multicolumn{1}{r}{(13)}&4.43^{*}& \multicolumn{1}{r}{(2)}&0.06 \\ 
		\hline 
		\hline \\[-1.8ex] 
		\textit{Note:} $^{*}p< 0.05$; $^{**}p< 0.01$; $^{***}p< 0.001$ \\ 
	\end{tabular}
	\endgroup
\end{table}


\newpage
\newpage
\section{Instructions for the Experiment} 
\label{s.instr}
\subsection*{Instructions I}

Please imagine the following situation: You \textbf{work as a freelancer}. 
Every round (which you could see as a month) you work on an assignment.
With the assignments you do, you earn a steady \textbf{income of 900 points}
per round (month).
However, there is always a possibility that you get sick.
When you get sick, you cannot work during that round.
Your client does not pay you as long as you do not finish your task,
which means you \textbf{do not earn anything} in that round.


In Part 3 of the study you will experience for \textbf{20 rounds} (months) that you either earn 900 points or, when you are sick, 0 points.
At the end of the study, one of the 20 rounds is randomly selected for payout.
So depending on your health status in the selected round, you either earn
another 900 points or 0 points for part 3 of this study.


Your risk stays the same over all rounds of Part 3.
With a risk of getting sick of 0.2, for instance, you would be sick and thus earning nothing
approximately \textbf{once every 5 rounds}.
A risk of 0.1 would mean earning nothing approximately once every 10 rounds;
a risk of 0.33 on average once every 3 rounds.


A way to reduce the effect of illness is to \textbf{share the risk} of losing your income.
You will be offered to start a risk-sharing group with up to 9 other people.
Each one of you would pay \textbf{300 points} every round.
From these contributions, a group member that is sick receives \textbf{750 points}.
If not all points are needed to pay sick group member(s), the remaining points \textbf{are given back} to you.
Hence, points are not saved across rounds and membership of the risk-sharing group never costs more than
300 points. Do note that a sick member also paid the contribution fee.


To start with, a couple of scenarios
where you are part of a risk-sharing group and you yourself are healthy.
\\ \\
\noindent \textit{10 members, 1 sick group member} \\
If all ten people join the risk-sharing group and one person (not you) gets sick,
the costs of this benefit are shared over ten persons.
Everyone pays 75 points, so of the 300 points you paid as a contribution you get 225 points returned.
You would \textbf{end up with $\mathbf{900 - 300 + 225 = 825}$ points} (\textsterling 5.5) that round.
\\ \\
\noindent \textit{10 members, 4 sick group members} \\
If four other persons get sick ($4 \times 750 = 3000$), the full sum of contributions ($10 \times 300 = 3000$) is needed
to pay the benefits for these people.
You would lose your entire contribution and \textbf{end up with 600 points} (\textsterling 4) that round.
\\ \\
\noindent \textit{5 members, 1 sick group member} \\
The fewer people that join, the fewer people you can support and the costlier support becomes.
With \textbf{5 members}, for instance, the sum of contributions is 5 $\times$ 300 = 1500 points.
If one person gets sick, each person would pay 150 points of the {{ Constants.benefit | c }}
and only get 150 points returned (\textbf{ending up with $\mathbf{900 - 300 + 150 = 750}$ points} that round).

This means a group of 5 members can only support up to two sick members per round.
See \Cref{t.instr} for an overview of how many members can receive maximum support for varying group sizes.

\begin{table}[h!]
	\centering
	\begingroup\footnotesize
	\label{t.instr}
	\caption{Overview of size common fund and members that can be supported}
	\begin{tabular}{@{\extracolsep{5pt}}ccc}
		\\[-1.8ex]\hline 
		\hline \\[-1.8ex] 
		Number of group members & Sum of contributions & Max. members full support \\
		\hline
		10 & 3000 & 4 \\
		9 & 2700 & 3 \\
		8 & 2400 & 3 \\
		7 & 2100 & 2 \\
		6 & 1800 & 2 \\
		5 & 1500 & 2 \\
		4 & 1200 & 1 \\
		3 & 900 & 1 \\
		2 & 600 & 0 \\
		\hline 
		\hline \\[-1.8ex] 
	\end{tabular}
	%	\begin{flushleft}
	%		\textit{Notes:} \textsuperscript{1} \\
	%	\end{flushleft}
	\endgroup
\end{table}

\noindent \textit{7 members, 3 sick group members} \\
If a risk-sharing group has more sick members than the maximum number the group can fully support,
the sick members do not receive the full 750 points but instead
\textbf{divide the sum of contributions}.
For instance, if in a group of 7 members 3 members get sick,
they each receive 700 points ($2100 / 3$) instead of 750 points.


Hence, membership of the risk-sharing group never costs more than 300 points.
As long as you are healthy, your earnings vary \textbf{between 900 and 600 points}.
On the other hand, if you get sick there is a higher variation in your earnings, also in the risk-sharing group.
Let's look at two more examples.
\\ \\
\noindent \textit{10 members, only you sick} \\
You receive most if you are the only sick member in a risk-sharing group of 10 people.
You would pay a contribution of 300 points, receive the benefit of 750 points,
and get 225 points of your contribution returned.
Your earnings would be \textbf{750 - 300 + 225= 675 points} (\textsterling 4.5).
\\ \\
\noindent \textit{7 members, you and two others sick} \\
If you are one of three sick members in the earlier mentioned group of 7,
you would pay 300 points and receive 700 points and therefore \textbf{end up with 400 points} (\textsterling 2.67).
\\ \\ 
\noindent Thus, your earnings depend on the total number of group members
and the number of sick members.
All in all, if you are sick they could vary \textbf{between 675 points and 0 points}
(the latter can only occur if all members are sick at the same time, which is extremely unlikely).


You can only choose to join the risk-sharing group in the first round.
If you do not join in round 1, you \textbf{will not get the chance} to do so in a later round either.
When you do not join the risk-sharing group, in every round your earnings depend only on your own risk
(you receive either 900 points or 0 points).
If you do join in round 1, in all next rounds you will be asked
if you want to \textbf{remain a member} of the risk-sharing group.
In every round, you can choose to leave the group.
However, if you do so you \textbf{cannot return in later rounds}.


After each round you will be \textbf{informed about the outcomes}:
Whether or not you were sick and how many points you would earn
if this round were drawn for the payment of Part 3.
If you joined the risk-sharing group, you will also be informed about
the total number of members, what the health status of the other members is (i.e., who got sick),
how much money was needed to pay sick group members,
and how much of the contribution will be returned to you.
Before we start Part 3 we will show two examples of what the screen of the decision situation might look like
and how this information is presented.


You and the people you can share risk with might not run the same chance of getting sick.
Each one of you gets a risk assigned \textbf{randomly}.
Other participants' risks may be lower or higher than yours, but this information is \textbf{not known}.
You will only be informed about your \textbf{personal risk of falling ill},
but you do not know the risk levels of other participants,
nor whether these are lower or higher than yours.
If your risk is higher than that of others, you benefit most from their help.
If your risk is lower, you will more often pay to help others than you will receive help in return.

\subsection*{Questions I}

We will ask you a couple of questions about the instructions.
Please note that this is \textbf{not a test}:
If you don't know the answer, you can look back into the instructions on the left.
You don't earn or lose points with right or wrong answers.
The purpose is merely to know if you understand the instructions.
If after reading the instructions and answering the questions
you're left with any question or doubt, you can contact the researcher
%(\textit{blinded for review}).
(Eva Vriens, e.vriens@uu.nl).
\\ \\
\noindent 1. How many rounds will you play in Part 3 of this study?
\\ \textbf{a)} 20
\\ b) 25
\\ c) 30
\\ \\
\noindent 2. What is your income from work each round?
\\ a) 800 points
\\ b) 850 points
\\ \textbf{c)} 900 points
\\ \\
\noindent 3. How much do you have to pay if you decide to share risk?
\\ a) 150 points
\\ b) 250 points
\\ \textbf{c)} 300 points
\\ \\
\noindent 4. With how many others can you potentially share risk?
\\ a) 8 people
\\ \textbf{b)} 9 people
\\ c) 10 people
\\ \\
\noindent 5. What can you earn in this part of the experiment?
\\ a) The sum of all points earned in all rounds
\\ \textbf{b)} The points earned in one randomly selected round
\\ \\
\noindent 6. What happens with your contribution if no one gets sick? 
\\ \textbf{a)} You get it back
\\ b) You lose your contribution
\\ \\
\noindent 7. What do you know about the other group members? 
\\ a) Nothing
\\ \textbf{b)} Only whether they also joined
\\ c) Whether they joined and how big their risk of getting sick is
\\ \\
\noindent 8. Can you choose to join the risk-sharing group in every round? 
\\ a) Yes, you can always join
\\ \textbf{b)} No, you can only join in round 1
\\ \\
\noindent 9. Can you return to the risk-sharing group in later rounds?
\\ a) Yes, you can always return
\\ \textbf{b)} No, once you left you cannot return
\newpage
\subsection*{Instructions II}

\begin{figure}[h!]
	\centering
	\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{R1_PC_P19.png}
	\caption{Example of a decision round }
	\label{f.example1}
	%	\begin{flushleft}\footnotesize
	%		\textit{Note:} Click on the screenshot to enlarge or use right-click to open it in a new tab.
	%	\end{flushleft}
\end{figure}

Above you see a screenshot of a possible decision page in the first round.
The top left box gives a summary of the decision situation.
The top right box is the decision box, where you can choose to join the risk-sharing group using the buttons Yes or No.
The boxes in the bottom row give information about the previous round(s) of the game.
For the first round, this is only your personal ID and sickness probability.

\subsection*{Questions II}

\noindent 1. What is the participant ID for the decision-screen?
\\ \textbf{a)} C
\\ b) D
\\ c) F
\\ \\
\noindent 2. What is the probability that this participant gets sick?
\\ a) 0.16
\\ \textbf{b)} 0.19
\\ c) 0.24
\subsection*{Instructions III}
\begin{figure}[h!]
	\centering
	\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{R7_PA_P21_H.png}
	\caption{Example of a decision round }
	\label{f.example2}
	%	\begin{flushleft}\footnotesize
	%		\textit{Note:} Click on the screenshot to enlarge or use right-click to open it in a new tab.
	%	\end{flushleft}
\end{figure}

The image shows a screenshot of the decision page in round 7 for someone who is a member of the risk-sharing group.
The decision box in the top right is almost similar to that in round 1, except that it asks if you
`\textbf{still want to be part of the risk-sharing group}' instead of whether you want to
`join the risk-sharing group'.
The other boxes give more information compared to round 1.


In rounds 2 and higher, the top left box gives a \textbf{recap of the outcome} of the previous round.
The color of the outline tells you whether you were sick in the previous round
(\textbf{\textcolor{expred}{red outline}}) or healthy (\textbf{\textcolor{expgreen}{green outline}}).
The recap further summarizes your income, and (in case you joined the risk-sharing group)
the size of your benefit (if sick), how many others got sick,
how many points were taken from the fund, the size of the fund,
and your earnings if the previous round would be drawn for the payment of part 3.


The three boxes in the bottom half give information about you and other participants
in the previous round (in this case round 6).
The box on the left outlines \textbf{personal characteristics}:
Your ID and sickness probability (as in round 1),
your health status, and the various points leading to your potential earnings
if at the end of the experiment that round is drawn for payout.


The box in the middle gives information \textbf{about the risk-sharing group}.
A \textbf{\textcolor{expred}{red outline}} means at least one member in the group was sick in the previous round.
A \textbf{\textcolor{expgreen}{green outline}} means that all members were healthy.
If the outline is red, the box also tells you which members were sick,
how many points were taken from the fund to pay them,
and how many points are left.


Finally, the box on the right gives an \textbf{overview of all sickness events}
of all members in all rounds before the current round (in this case: 1-6).
In the example, it states that member A was sick once in all six rounds, whereas member F was sick three out of six rounds.
\textbf{\textcolor{expgreen}{Green}} and \textbf{\textcolor{expred}{red}} colors
refer to the health status of all members in the previous round,
meaning that members in red were sick the previous round (in this case: 6).
If members drop out of the risk-sharing group, their information is no longer available.
Their IDs are listed in grey.


The two tables with information about the risk-sharing group are available
for \textbf{members only}. If you drop out, you are no longer informed about
the number of people that are part of the risk-sharing group, the people who got sick, etc.

\subsection*{Questions III}

\noindent 1. How much would member A earn if round 6 were drawn for payoff?
\\ a) 900 points
\\ b) 19 points
\\ \textbf{c)} 619 points
\\ \\
\noindent 2. How many people are a member of the risk-sharing group (including A)?
\\ a) 6
\\ b) 7
\\ \textbf{c)} 8
\\ \\
\noindent 3. Which people are not part of the risk-sharing group?
\\ a) A
\\ \textbf{b)} B and G
\\ c) D, H and J
\\ \\
\noindent 4. Which members were sick in round 6?
\\ a) A
\\ b) B and G
\\ \textbf{c)} D, H and J
\\ \\
\noindent 5. What would happen if A had also been sick in round 6?
\\ \textbf{a)} All sick members would receive 600 points instead of 750
\\ b) A would only receive the 150 points that are left in the fund

\end{document}